IVR Conference Special Workshop 67

Description

In his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen tries to a construe a solid scientific foundation for the science of law. For that purpose, the question has to be answered what is typical or unique about the way the science of law understands its object. Kelsen argues that the phenomenon of law can be studied from two different perspectives: either how it should be (Sollen) or how it is (Sein). These two perspectives correspond with two different disciplines from which law can be studied: respectively, a normative science of law that determines deductively which rules are valid, and an explanatory sociology of law that establish inductively a certain regularity for which it tries to find a causal explanation. It is equally possible and legitimate to study law from both perspectives, but not at the same time. If Kelsen would be right, the possibilities for interdisciplinary research into law would be very limited. However, a strict fact-value separation is rejected by scholars adhering to other, non-positivist scientific approaches, in particular hermeneutics and pragmatism. A forceful pragmatist defense of the inseparability of facts and values is provided by Hilary Putnam. According to him, knowledge of facts presumes knowledge of values and, vice versa, knowledge of values presumes knowledge of facts. Although we can in principle distinguish factual judgments from evaluative judgments, many of those judgments are mixed and there is not a clear separating line between the two categories. In our workshop we intend to organize a discussion about the tenability of the fact/value distinction and its relevance for interdisciplinary research. Proponents of different (positivist, pragmatic and hermeneutic) positions are invited to give their view on the matter.

Period	2011
Event type	Workshop
Location	FrankfurtShow on map