Abstract
The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in China allows the responsible authority for merger control to consider not only the competition interest but also other public interest reasons when it reviews a takeover or merger. Where the responsible authority considers that the benefits of a takeover or merger to the public interest outweigh the harms to competition, it may ‘exempt’ the transaction. This ‘public interest exemption’ has never been formally applied since the introduction of the law in 2008. One explanation for this can be found in the ambiguity of the law: there are no legal provisions that clarify the public interest considerations. A second explanation is that China did not establish a separate review procedure for this public interest exemption. In practice, some approval decisions made by the enforcement authority led to confusion, as it was unclear whether the transactions were ‘exempted’ for public interest reasons or for industrial policies. This article reflects on the role of the public interest exemption in China. By drawing lessons from the past and examining the public interest exemption regime in Germany, it aims to provide suggestions for future reforms, against the background of the promulgation of the Amendment to the AML in 2022.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 491-508 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Journal of Antitrust Enforcement |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2023 |
Bibliographical note
JEL Classification: K21The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.