Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There’s no Vicious Reference

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Abstract

In a recent paper, Philip Kremer proposes a formal and theory-relative desideratum for theories of truth that is spelled out in terms of the notion of ‘no vicious reference’. Kremer’s Modified Gupta-Belnap Desideratum (MGBD) reads as follows: if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. In this paper, we suggest an alternative desideratum (AD): if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that all T-biconditionals are (strongly) ssertible in M. We illustrate that MGBD and AD are not equivalent by means of a Generalized Strong Kleene theory of truth and we argue that AD is preferable over MGBD as a desideratum for theories of truth.
Original languageUndefined/Unknown
Pages (from-to)665-690
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume43
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Research programs

  • EUR ESPHIL 12

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