Audit committee accounting expertise, CEO power, and audit pricing

Jaeyoon Yu, B Kwak, YD LIm, HT Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)
57 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) mandates that all listed firms disclose whether they have a financial expert on the audit committee, highlighting the committee’s expertise. However, some argue that non-accounting financial experts, compared to accounting financial experts, are not sufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness because the former lack accounting knowledge. Accounting experts on audit committees may require higher audit efforts, while auditors may assess audit committees with accounting financial experts as effective, decreasing audit efforts. This paper first inspects the effect of audit committee accounting expertise on audit fees as a proxy for audit efforts, and then investigates whether the effect is moderated by powerful CEOs. Using post-SOX period data, our results show that, on average, firms with accounting experts on audit committees are more likely to pay higher audit fees, and the effect is less pronounced when a powerful CEO manages a firm.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)421-439
Number of pages19
JournalAsia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
Volume24
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Nov 2015

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