Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions

Sander Renes

Research output: Book/Report/Inaugural speech/Farewell speechReportAcademic

Abstract

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract skewed/unbalanced bids, i.e. bids where the price structure is distorted to take advantage of estimation errors. This paper shows that by either allowing for some secrecy or post tender competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can decrease bid skewing.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationRotterdam
PublisherTinbergen Institute
EditionTI Discussion Papers 11-047/1
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

SeriesTI Discussion Papers
Volume11-047/1

Research programs

  • EUR ESE 02

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