Abstract
How does the zero lower bound on deposit rates (ZLB) affect how banks respond to capital regulation? I study this question in a model in which households value the liquidity services of deposits yet do not accept negative deposit rates. When deposit rates are constrained by the ZLB, tight capital requirements disproportionately hurt franchise values and are therefore less effective in curbing excessive risk taking. The model delivers a novel rationale for “interest-dependent” capital regulation that is optimally laxer when the ZLB binds and tighter when the ZLB is slack but may bind in the future.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1028-1059 |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2025 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 The Author(s).
Research programs
- RSM F&A
- ESE - ECO
- ESE - F&A
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