Board Structure Variety in Cooperatives

George Hendrikse, Jerker Nilsson

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic


This paper investigates why agricultural cooperatives exhibit different principles for the allocation of decision rights between the Board of Directors and the Management. A mass-action interpretation of the Nash equilibrium in an investment proposal game shows that, on the one hand, board structure variety is an equilibrium outcome while, on the other hand, the traditional model (the board has full control) and the management model (the professional management makes up the Board of the cooperative society) perform better than the corporation model (the Management is in full control of the cooperative firm).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Management Science
EditorsGeorge Hendrikse, Gerard Cliquet, Ilir Hajdini, Aveed Raha, Josef Windsperger
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-031-18134-4
ISBN (Print)978-3-031-18133-7
Publication statusPublished - 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.


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