Abstract
This paper discusses the accountability gap problem posed by artificial intelligence. After sketching out
the accountability gap problem we turn to ancient Roman law and scrutinise how slave-run businesses
dealt with the accountability gap through an indirect agency of slaves. Our analysis shows that Roman
law developed a heterogeneous framework in which multiple legal remedies coexist to accommodate
the various competing interests of owners and contracting third parties. Moreover, Roman law shows
that addressing the various emerging interests had been a continuous and gradual process of allocating
risks among different stakeholders. The paper concludes that these two findings are key for contemporary
discussions on how to regulate artificial intelligence.
the accountability gap problem we turn to ancient Roman law and scrutinise how slave-run businesses
dealt with the accountability gap through an indirect agency of slaves. Our analysis shows that Roman
law developed a heterogeneous framework in which multiple legal remedies coexist to accommodate
the various competing interests of owners and contracting third parties. Moreover, Roman law shows
that addressing the various emerging interests had been a continuous and gradual process of allocating
risks among different stakeholders. The paper concludes that these two findings are key for contemporary
discussions on how to regulate artificial intelligence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-80 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Legal Studies |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 18 Jan 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 18 Mar 2024 |
Bibliographical note
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Society of Legal Scholars.Erasmus Sectorplan
- Sectorplan Recht-Public and Private Interests
