Cognition and Incentives in Cooperatives

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

We extend the results of Feng and Hendrikse (2012) by investigating the relationship between cognition and incentives in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms (IOFs) in a multi-tasking principal-agent model. The principal chooses the incentive intensity as well as the precision of monitoring, while the agent chooses the activities. We establish that a cooperative is uniquely efficient when either the synergy between the upstream and downstream activities or the knowledgeability of the members regarding the cooperative enterprise is sufficiently high.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCognition and Incentives in Cooperatives
EditorsGeorge Hendrikse, Gerard Cliquet, Ilir Hajdini, Aveed Raha, Josef Windsperger
Pages43-62
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-031-18134-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

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