Competing Standard-Setting Organizations: A Choice Experiment

Paul Moritz Wiegmann; Felix Eggers; Henk J. de Vries; Knut Blind

doi:10.1016/j.respol.2021.104427

Competing Standard-Setting Organizations: A Choice Experiment

Paul Moritz Wiegmann^*, Felix Eggers, Henk J. de Vries, Knut Blind

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Technology and Operations Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

60 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) establish goal-directed networks for innovators to jointly shape technology and markets through standards. The degree to which this can succeed depends to a large extent on network characteristics, which may differ substantially between SSOs. Many technological fields face intense competition between SSOs. Choosing the right one is thus a key strategic decision for innovators. Simultaneously, SSOs must reflect members’ preferences in their network set-ups and governance. Yet, little is known about these preferences. Based on extant literature, we derive hypotheses about how three themes of network attributes (membership base, rules, transaction costs) and contextual factors drive decision makers’ preferences. We conduct a comprehensive choice experiment with 141 standardization professionals in the Internet of Things field. Based on our data, we provide a more realistic indication of what firms value in SSOs than has been previously available. We also discuss our results’ implications for studying networks in other contexts.

Original language	English
Article number	104427
Journal	Research Policy
Volume	51
Issue number	2
Early online date	25 Nov 2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2021.104427
Publication status	Published - Mar 2022

Bibliographical note

Acknowledgements:
We thank participants at the 2017 EURAS and EURAM conferences, the 2020 virtual Academy of Management Conference and the Berkeley Open Innovation Seminar, as well as three anonymous reviewers, Ursula Lohr-Wiegmann, Robert Suurmond, Henk van Rhee, and Jaime Bonn?n Roca for their helpful comments and suggestions at various stages of this research project. We also thank DKE, the Zigbee Alliance, DIN, ETSI, and Oasis for kindly providing access to their members to conduct the choice experiment. Any errors and omissions remain the full responsibility of the authors. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021

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10.1016/j.respol.2021.104427

1-s2.0-S0048733321002201-mainLicence: CC BY

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Competing Standard-Setting Organizations: A Choice Experiment

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