Abstract
Platform economy has increasingly become the model for businesses to maintain their competitive edge in the digital era. Banning behavior is the most prevalent and potent method for platforms to build up high walls to prevent competitors, it may slowly transform the web to a series of walled gardens that prevent consumers from spotting alternatives and dramatically increases the cost of reconnecting to other platforms. A thorough understanding of the implications of banning behavior and an evaluation of its competitive harm are prerequisites for competition law intervention. To solve this problem in the context of competition law, various legal measures have been proposed by States worldwide. The EU DMA and China’s competition law exemplify two different legislative strategies to tackle platform banning behaviors, and neither is flawless. Reflecting on these approaches and their potential impacts can provide valuable insights for future competition laws regulating banning behaviors.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 32 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 4 Apr 2024 |
Externally published | Yes |
Erasmus Sectorplan
- Sector plan SSH-Breed