Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment (AER: Papers and Proceedings)

CN (Charles) Noussair, DP Soest, van, Jan Stoop

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-7
Number of pages7
JournalThe American Economic Review
Volume105
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment (AER: Papers and Proceedings)'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this