TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment (AER: Papers and Proceedings)
AU - Noussair, CN (Charles)
AU - Soest, van, DP
AU - Stoop, Jan
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
AB - We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
U2 - 10.1257/aer.p20151018
DO - 10.1257/aer.p20151018
M3 - Article
VL - 105
SP - 1
EP - 7
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
SN - 0002-8282
IS - 5
ER -
