Determinants of contractual completeness in franchising

George Hendrikse, Josef Windsperger*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The aim of the study is to explain the determinants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by formulating and testing various propositions derived from transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and relational view of governance. The degree of contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust (positively), franchisees’ specific investments (negatively), environmental uncertainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-specific know-how.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Management Science
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages13-30
Number of pages18
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

SeriesContributions to Management Science
ISSN1431-1941

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2011, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Determinants of contractual completeness in franchising'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this