Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of the initiation of governance analyst coverage. Governance analysts process, enhance, and disseminate governance-related information to capital market participants via, for example, governance reports and ratings. Using an exogenous shock in the United Kingdom, I find that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved liquidity, increased financial analyst following, and improved investor breadth. These findings are consistent with governance analysts creating value for firms via monitoring, information dissemination/production, and investor recognition.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 721-761 |
Number of pages | 41 |
Journal | Journal of Accounting Research |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2019 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2018