Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More?: Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

Pablo Hernandez; Dylan Minor; Dana Sisak

doi:10.1007/s10683-017-9512-9

Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

Pablo Hernandez^*, Dylan Minor, Dana Sisak

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	809-835
Number of pages	27
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume	20
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9512-9
Publication status	Published - 14 Mar 2017

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abstract = "We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15\% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.",

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AB - We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.

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JO - Experimental Economics

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Do People Who Care About Others Cooperate More? Experimental Evidence from Relative Incentive Pay

Abstract

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