Abstract
This dissertation bundles three empirical studies on actively managed mutual funds. These studies provide
new insights into the costs and benets of portfolio disclosure and shed more light into the question whether
mutual fund investors have an information advantage over other market participants. Chapter 2 develops a
simple trading strategy which front-runs the anticipated forced sales by mutual funds experiencing extreme
capital outows. The ndings in this chapter suggest that publicly available information on fund holdings
exposes mutual funds in distress to predatory trading. Chapter 3 studies investors sophistication and shows
that mutual fund investors are probably more sophisticated than previously thought. The evidence in this
chapter suggests that investors use portfolio holdings information in order to infer managerial skill and
benet from shifting capital towards skilled fund managers. Thus, while chapter 2 provides evidence for
the potential costs of portfolio disclosure, chapter 3 quanties the benets from the actual use of portfolio
holdings information by mutual fund investors. Chapter 4 uses disclosed fund holdings in order to study the
information content of mutual funds' trades. The study documents that prior to 2001, stocks purchased by
funds outperform stocks they sell. However, the opposite happens after 2001. The ndings in this chapter
suggest that mutual fund managers might have lost their information advantage over time. An important,
although not sole reason for this eect is reduction in selective access to rm information following the
implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2001.
Original language | English |
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Awarding Institution |
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Supervisors/Advisors |
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Award date | 17 Jan 2014 |
Place of Publication | Rotterdam |
Print ISBNs | 9789058923523 |
Publication status | Published - 17 Jan 2014 |
Research programs
- RSM F&A