External interventions and conflicts in Africa after the end of the Cold War

In light of the persistence of armed conflict within the context of exten-sive foreign interventions, this research investigates the effect of external interventions on state-based conflict intensity. The main study comprises four papers using a mixed method approach analysing conflict interven-tions in Africa from the end of the Cold War up to 2010. An additional paper focuses on the legality of institutional decisions over military inter-ventions in Africa using a process tracing approach. In the main study the specification of the dependent variable is carried out through a com-parative analysis of the validity and reliability of a series of datasets lead-ing to the selection of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme Georefer-ence events Dataset (UCDP-GED). For the conflicts in Africa between 1989 and 2010 a new dataset on external interventions is coded with 576 entries, revising and adding to the dataset of Regan et al. (2009). A theo-retical rational choice model of the balance of the parties’ capabilities and how external interventions affect the utility of fighting is tested on a case study in Somalia and with an econometric analysis of the new dataset. Preliminary results validate expectations and other findings in the litera-ture according to which partisan, military and economic interventions escalate conflict while neutral, diplomatic and UN missions de-escalate conflict. However, after controlling for the reverse causality on the rela-tionship between conflict intensity and external interventions, only the escalatory effects remain significant, a plausible result considering some of the mechanisms identified in the case study. Furthermore these unex-pected results are not dependent on the success or failure of diplomatic efforts, after controlling for reverse causality. In sum, the more robust effect is that partisan and military interventions increase conflict intensi-ty, while the neutral and diplomatic effect requires further investigation. Building on these results, an additional fifth paper show that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), centered on the African Union and based on the principle of subsidiarity, does not explicitly and fully safeguard United Nations Security Council (UN SC) primacy over deci-sions on military interventions. The way in which subsidiarity is imple-mented within the APSA and between the African Union and United Nations determines if UN SC primacy is a foundational principle of the security intervention architecture.