Abstract
Dorn's chapter addresses three, inter-related public goods: systemic stability of financial markets, diversity in regulatory regimes, and democratic steering. Politicisation and democratic control of financial market policies and regulation – introducing a greater diversity of objectives and business models across countries and regions – has potential to reduce market herding, ‘Too Similar To Fail’, ‘Too Connected To Fail’ and public subsidy of private actors. This analysis, both functional and normative, is compatible with a global regulatory design of cooperative decentralization and with a deepening of democracy in the European Union. Within this perspective, accountability narratives are open to criticism as giving cover for a technocratic, one-size-fits-all regulatory mind-set, which is inherently destabilising and crisis-generating.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Accountability and Regulatory Governance. Audiences, Controls and Responsibilities in the Politics of Regulation |
| Editors | A Bianculli, X Fernández-i-Marín, J Jordana |
| Place of Publication | Basingstoke |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Bibliographical note
Publication date December 2014. Sections of the chapter:INTRODUCTION
The trouble with accountability
‘TOO CONNECTED TO FAIL’: DANGERS STILL PRESENT
The weakness of strong ties
The potential for contagion
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION: CAUGHT BETWEEN HOMOGENISATION AND DIVERSITY
Reverse accountability
Theorising regulatory performances
Way forward
Objections (a) market arbitrage
Objections (b) political rent-seeking
CONDUCT REGULATION: HELPMATE OR DISTRACTION?
The lure of misconduct
Professional gatekeepers
CONCLUSION.
Research programs
- SAI 2005-04 MSS