Harmonization of corporate tax systems and its effect on collusive behavior

Dirk Schindler*, Guttorm Schjelderup

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)599-621
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2009
Externally publishedYes


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