Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments?

P Denter; Dana Sisak

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008

Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments?

P Denter
, Dana Sisak

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

29 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	94-97
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	149
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008
Publication status	Published - Dec 2016

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008

1-s2.0-S0165176516304001-mainFinal published version, 387 KBLicence: Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act

Cite this

@article{6f862ad16fb444628ed0fbf65fe5b494,

title = "Head Starts in Dynamic Tournaments?",

abstract = "In promotion contests or other tournament-like situations, a principal may attach some value to the highest effort expended by an agent. We show that whenever agents interact over multiple periods, awarding a head start to one of them is optimal even with completely symmetric agents. Awarding a small head start increases maximum individual effort without decreasing aggregate effort.",

author = "P Denter and Dana Sisak",

year = "2016",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.008",

language = "English",

volume = "149",

pages = "94--97",

journal = "Economics Letters",