TY - JOUR
T1 - How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC
AU - Swank, Job
AU - Swank, Otto
AU - Visser, Bauke
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. (JEL: D71, D72, D82, E58)
AB - Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision makers. We show that such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Also, if such committees are required to become transparent, for example, by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. A large part of the article is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting our theory. (JEL: D71, D72, D82, E58)
U2 - 10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.478
DO - 10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.478
M3 - Article
SN - 1542-4774
VL - 6
SP - 478
EP - 486
JO - Journal of the European Economic Association
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
ER -