How the tortoise became a hare: On the initial sclerosis and ultimate modernisation of Dutch competition policy

Lilian T.D. Petit*, Jarig van Sinderen, Peter A.G. van Bergeijk

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

2 Citations (Scopus)
13 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Dutch economic policy making traditionally aims at consensus and cooperation between employers, trade unions and the government to find a balance between sustainable growth, a low level of unemployment and acceptable wage increases. In this so-called Polder Model, the different parties attempt to strike a balance between the freedom to negotiate legally on wages and working conditions, and the impact of these negotiations on economic and social goals. The Polder Model was also clearly evident in the Dutch policy towards cartelisation through much of the twentieth century. Cooperation and consensus was desired between both the participants in the markets and between the government and the market (see also Bouwens and Dankers 2012). From 1935 until 1998, competition legislation allowed the formation of domestic cartels. Particular statutes in 1935, 1941 and 1958 arose from the changing circumstances at that time. The relatively tolerant Competition Law of 1958 remained in effect for about 40 years. This finally changed in 1998 when the Netherlands passed a new Competition Law that met international standards and also established an independent competition authority.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationRegulating Competition
Subtitle of host publicationCartel Registers in the Twentieth-Century World
EditorsS. Fellman, M. Shanahan
Place of PublicationAbingdon, UK
PublisherRoutledge
Pages66-87
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781317693994
ISBN (Print)9781138021648
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Research programs

  • EUR-ISS-EDEM

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