TY - CHAP
T1 - Imported case of Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever, in the Netherlands
AU - Timen, Aura
AU - Koopmans, Marion P.G.
AU - Vossen, Ann C.T.M.
AU - Van Doornum, Gerard J.J.
AU - Günther, Stephan
AU - Van Den Berkmortel, Franchette
AU - Verduin, Kees M.
AU - Dittrich, Sabine
AU - Emmerich, Petra
AU - Osterhaus, Albert D.M.E.
AU - Van Dissel, Jaap T.
AU - Coutinho, Roel A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2012 by Apple Academic Press, Inc.
PY - 2011/1/1
Y1 - 2011/1/1
N2 - On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) was confirmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus (MARV). A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last possible exposure. The case raised questions specific to international travel, postexposure prophylaxis for MARV, and laboratory testing of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey of contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high public health impact.
AB - On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) was confirmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave (Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg virus (MARV). A multidisciplinary response team was convened to perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classification of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last possible exposure. The case raised questions specific to international travel, postexposure prophylaxis for MARV, and laboratory testing of contacts with fever. We present lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey of contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction during an event with a high public health impact.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85059560590
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85059560590
SN - 9781926692920
SN - 9781774632307
SP - 193
EP - 198
BT - Hospitality and Health
A2 - Seba, Jaime A.
ER -
