Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations: Do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict?

H Aaldering, LL (Lindred) Greer, GA van Kleef, CKW de Dreu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Abstract: In representative negotiations, interests of the representative and the represented constituency are not always aligned. We investigated how interest (mis)alignment and representative¿s social value orientation influence representative negotiations. Past theory and research on the principal¿agent problem, social value orientation, and cooperation in social dilemmas offer different perspectives, which we examined in two experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that both representatives with a pro-social and a pro-self value orientation were reluctant to accommodate the negotiation adversary at a cost to themselves and their constituency, while pro-social representatives were more willing to sacrifice self-interest to benefit constituency and adversary combined. Experiment 2 replicated this finding, and clarified that pro-social representatives were more willing to self-sacrifice when this served their constituency only than when it indirectly served the adversary too. Such parochial altruism demonstrates the discriminatory nature of pro-socials¿ cooperation and reveals the potential dark side of a pro-social orientation in constructive intergroup negotiations.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)240-250
Number of pages11
JournalOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Volume120
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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