Intuition, Interference, Inhibition, and Individual Differences in Fuzzy-Trace Theory

Applying a fuzzy-trace theory perspective, this chapter examines how reliance on gist and verbatim representations, interference, inhibition, and individual differences in cognitive ability (e.g., intelligence and working memory capacity) explains variability in judgment and decision making (with an emphasis on probability judgment and risky-choice framing effects). For example, the conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge an intersection of probabilistic events (i.e. both A and B occur) as more likely than one of the events separately (i.e. either A or B occurring). The classic example of this is the Linda problem, in which people rate the hypothetical character Linda as being more likely to be a feminist and a bank teller than any bank teller—based on a stereotypic description of Linda. In addition to explaining classic examples of biases such as this one, they also introduce recent research that has been done to identify how theories of memory representation and decision making—specifically fuzzy-trace theory—can explain and predict these biases. This chapter describes the role of intuition and interference in supporting biases, and covers the role of inhibition (as measured by intelligence tests and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies) in avoiding such biases. Finally, they will discuss research that has shown that inhibition does not always play a role in avoiding bias, and describe how fuzzy-trace theory accounts for such findings.