Abstract
Background:
Financial incentive interventions for improving physical activity have proven to be effective but costly. Deposit contracts (a type of incentive in which participants pledge their own money) could be an affordable alternative. In addition, deposit contracts may have superior effects by exploiting the power of loss aversion. Previous research often operationalized deposit contracts through framing a financial reward as a loss (without requiring a deposit) to mimic the feelings of loss involved in a deposit contract.
Objective:
This study aims to disentangle the effects of incurring actual losses (through self-funding a deposit contract) and loss framing. We investigated (1) whether incentive conditions are more effective than a no-incentive control condition, (2) whether deposit contracts have lower uptake than financial rewards, (3) whether deposit contracts are more effective than financial rewards, and (4) whether loss frames are more effective than gain frames.
Methods:
Healthy participants (N = 126) with an average age of 22.7 years participated in a 20-day physical activity intervention. They downloaded a smartphone application that provided them with a personalised physical activity goal and either required a €10 deposit upfront (which could be lost) or provided €10 as a reward, contingent on performance. Daily feedback on incentive earnings was provided and framed as either a loss or a gain. We employed a 2 (incentive type: deposit vs reward) x 2 (feedback frame: gain vs loss) between-subjects factorial design with a no incentive control condition. Our primary outcome was the number of days participants achieved their goal. Uptake of the intervention was a secondary outcome.
Results:
Overall, financial incentive conditions (M = 13.10 days) had higher effectiveness than the control condition (M = 8.00 days), p = .002, ηp2 = .147. Deposit contracts had lower uptake (61.7%) than rewards (100%), p =
Conclusions:
We found that financial incentives help increase physical activity, but deposit contracts were not more effective than rewards. Although self-funded deposit contracts can be offered at low cost, low uptake is an important obstacle for large scale implementation. Unexpectedly, loss framing was less effective than gain framing. Therefore, we urge for more research on their boundary conditions before using loss framed incentives in practice. Clinical Trial: OSF Registries, https://osf.io/34ygt
Financial incentive interventions for improving physical activity have proven to be effective but costly. Deposit contracts (a type of incentive in which participants pledge their own money) could be an affordable alternative. In addition, deposit contracts may have superior effects by exploiting the power of loss aversion. Previous research often operationalized deposit contracts through framing a financial reward as a loss (without requiring a deposit) to mimic the feelings of loss involved in a deposit contract.
Objective:
This study aims to disentangle the effects of incurring actual losses (through self-funding a deposit contract) and loss framing. We investigated (1) whether incentive conditions are more effective than a no-incentive control condition, (2) whether deposit contracts have lower uptake than financial rewards, (3) whether deposit contracts are more effective than financial rewards, and (4) whether loss frames are more effective than gain frames.
Methods:
Healthy participants (N = 126) with an average age of 22.7 years participated in a 20-day physical activity intervention. They downloaded a smartphone application that provided them with a personalised physical activity goal and either required a €10 deposit upfront (which could be lost) or provided €10 as a reward, contingent on performance. Daily feedback on incentive earnings was provided and framed as either a loss or a gain. We employed a 2 (incentive type: deposit vs reward) x 2 (feedback frame: gain vs loss) between-subjects factorial design with a no incentive control condition. Our primary outcome was the number of days participants achieved their goal. Uptake of the intervention was a secondary outcome.
Results:
Overall, financial incentive conditions (M = 13.10 days) had higher effectiveness than the control condition (M = 8.00 days), p = .002, ηp2 = .147. Deposit contracts had lower uptake (61.7%) than rewards (100%), p =
Conclusions:
We found that financial incentives help increase physical activity, but deposit contracts were not more effective than rewards. Although self-funded deposit contracts can be offered at low cost, low uptake is an important obstacle for large scale implementation. Unexpectedly, loss framing was less effective than gain framing. Therefore, we urge for more research on their boundary conditions before using loss framed incentives in practice. Clinical Trial: OSF Registries, https://osf.io/34ygt
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | e38339 |
| Journal | Journal of Medical Internet Research |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Oct 2022 |
Bibliographical note
AcknowledgmentsThis work was supported by The Netherlands Cardiovascular Research Initiative, an initiative with support of the Dutch Heart
Foundation, CVON2016-12 BENEFIT, ZonMw (The Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development), Leiden
University, and the members of the BENEFIT consortium. Furthermore, the authors would like to thank Fiona Brosig (Research
Master student, Psychology, Leiden University) for her assistance in developing the intervention, recruiting participants, and
running the experiment.
Publisher Copyright:
©David R de Buisonjé, Thomas Reijnders, Talia R Cohen Rodrigues, Santhanam Prabhakaran, Tobias Kowatsch, Stefan A Lipman, Tammo H A Bijmolt, Linda D Breeman, Veronica R Janssen, Roderik A Kraaijenhagen, Hareld M C Kemps, Andrea W M Evers. Originally published in the Journal of Medical Internet Research (https://www.jmir.org), 06.10.2022.