Is Conspiracy Theory a Case of Conceptual Domination?

We are convinced that conceptual domination is a genuine phenomenon, and conceptual engineers should be careful when proposing ameliorations of concepts based on the assumption that speakers engaged in conceptual disputes are always driven by inquiry related aims. Yet we remain unconvinced that conspiracy theory_e is one such case. Clearly, not every case of discrediting is unjust and unwarranted. And even within the unjust cases, sometimes unjust power structures can make it the case that perfectly fine concepts can be used to discredit and marginalize. But this can speak to a problematic feature of the world, rather than of our concepts. So, we should be careful in checking that a certain theory to which the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is applied is in fact a conspiracy theory, especially when the accusation comes from people in power. And we should make sure that dominant institutions’ conspiracy theories are called ‘conspiracy theories’ and treated as central cases in academic analyses. But does this tell us anything about the prospects for reengineering the concept conspiracy theory_e? We don’t think so.