TY - JOUR
T1 - Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals
AU - Bijkerk, Suzanne
AU - Dominguez Martinez, Silvia
AU - Kamphorst, Jurjen
AU - Swank, Otto
PY - 2021/4
Y1 - 2021/4
N2 - We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women’s abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.
AB - We analyze the consequences of labor market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor market quotas create uncertainty about the reason a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted female employees because of the quota or their ability; their competitors do not. A winner’s curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante, women are better off without quotas. Next we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn women’s abilities to make better job assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.
UR - https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/710358
U2 - 10.1086/710358
DO - 10.1086/710358
M3 - Article
SN - 0734-306X
VL - 39
SP - 437
EP - 460
JO - Journal of Labor Economics
JF - Journal of Labor Economics
IS - 2
ER -