New voting arrangements in EU economic governance- How the ESM treaty and RQMV change the representation of small Member States

This paper assesses the introduction of two new voting procedures, the calculation of a qualified majority under the ESM emergency procedure, and reversed qualified majority voting (RQMV) in the reformed system of EU economic governance under the Treaties, against the implicit constitutional principle of small state protection in the EU. It will be argued that protection of small Member States in the EU is ensured by means of overrepresentation and one -state- one- vote majority requirements. Due to the consistent application of these mechanisms throughout the Treaties, one can assert an implicit constitutional principle of small state protection in the EU. The new voting procedures have considerable consequences for this principle. This paper asserts a shift from the determining elements for voting allocation from, first population and second, a correcting element for small Member States within the EU framework to capital contribution as the sole determining factor for voting allocation in the context of the ESM. This shift becomes especially apparent when contrasting it to the introduction of RQMV under the EU framework, which will be argued, has a strengthening effect on small state protection. This incoherent application of the principle could possibly be remedied by an incorporation of the ESM into the EU framework.