Nietzsche als einde en als overgang - Heideggers confrontatie met Nietzsche in de dertiger jaren

This article investigates the development of Heidegger's ambiguous relation with Nietzsche in the thirties. On the one hand, he claims that Nietzsche embodies the end of metaphysics, and as such is in transition to another beginning of philosophy. On the other hand, he maintains that Nietzsche is the end of metaphysics, and as such obstructs another beginning of Philosophy. Why is Heidegger of two minds? If Nietzsche is both end and transition, then his way of thinking must be ambiguous. His analysis of Nietzsche's concept of the 'will' shows us, that according to Heidegger, the transitivity of Nietzsche lies in de ambiguity of his philosophical con cepts. Because of this ambiguity, Nietzsche's thought is end and transition. Later on, Heidegger changes his mind because of his reading of Ernst Jünger's book Der Arbeiter (1932). After reading Jünger, he realizes that the end of metaphysics cannot herald a new way of philosophical thinking, as long as it is related to the concept of the will. That is the reason why Heidegger later on maintains that Nietzsche is the end of metaphysics, and as such obstructs another beginning of philosophy. We finish this article with a critical question regarding Heidegger's concept of the 'end'.