Abstract
This thesis contributes to debates in practical and instrumental rationality, ethics, and political philosophy by exploring the relationship between the value of having choices and that of making them. It focuses on how the non-instrumental value of having, and making, choices affects the conceptualization and appraisal of theories of practical and instrumental rationality, autonomy, and the measurement of freedom.
It addresses two questions:
- How does the non-instrumental value of having and making choices affect the measurement of freedom and the conceptualization of autonomy?
- How does the non-instrumental value of having and making choices help appraise the standard picture of practical and instrumental rationality?
Answering these questions illuminates fundamental – and yet neglected – tensions between the value of having choices and that of making them.
It addresses two questions:
- How does the non-instrumental value of having and making choices affect the measurement of freedom and the conceptualization of autonomy?
- How does the non-instrumental value of having and making choices help appraise the standard picture of practical and instrumental rationality?
Answering these questions illuminates fundamental – and yet neglected – tensions between the value of having choices and that of making them.
| Original language | English |
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| Award date | 10 Oct 2024 |
| Place of Publication | Rotterdam |
| Print ISBNs | 978-90-834422-8-0 |
| Publication status | Published - 10 Oct 2024 |