On the allegedly invisible Dutch constructions sector cartel

Peter A.G. van Bergeijk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of markets in the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidence of bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applications in which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer a case study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologies that were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets in the Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sector as problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriously flawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properly applied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detection of antitrust violations directly, or by informing them where to look for direct evidence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-128
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Competition Law and Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2008


Dive into the research topics of 'On the allegedly invisible Dutch constructions sector cartel'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this