Original position arguments: An axiomatic characterization

Thijs De Coninck, Frederik Van De Putte*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

We study original position arguments in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general formal framework for such arguments. Next, we provide an axiomatic characterization of social choice rules that can be supported by original position arguments. We illustrate this characterization in terms of various well-known social choice rules, some of which do and some of which do not satisfy the axioms in question. Depending on the perspective one takes, our results can be used to argue against certain rules, against Rawlsian theories of procedural fairness, or in support of richer, multidimensional models of individual choice.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics and Philosophy
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2 Dec 2024

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Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2024.

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