Abstract
We argue that liquidity constrained firms face strong incentives to hire experienced, but low ability workers instead of novice workers with higher upside potential. Using four decades of high-frequency information on worker performance in a "superstar" labor market allows us to estimate the revealed ability of experienced workers at the time they are hired by a new firm. More than one-fifth of these hires are "substandard" in that the revealed ability of the hired experienced worker lies below the mean ability of recent novices. Even more hires (around 40%) are "mediocre," as their ability falls short of the hiring threshold that maximizes the long-run average ability of the active workforce. Replacing mediocre hires by novice workers would increase the average ability of the workforce by 0.1 standard deviations. (JEL J31, J44, L83, M51).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 840-888 |
| Number of pages | 49 |
| Journal | Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University.