Abstract
For years, a debate raged within German elites and the public over whether Germany should continue to contribute to NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement and procure new fighter jets equipped to carry US nuclear weapons. While this was ostensibly a technical issue, it touched on the very foundations of Germany’s security policy. In the run-up to the elections in 2021, several party manifestos called for the withdrawal of US weapons from German soil, reflecting public skepticism. However, the new German government swiftly reaffirmed its long-term commitment to nuclear sharing and, soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, upped the ante by deciding to purchase F-35 fighter jets. Why could the German government quickly put an end to a debate that had preoccupied German policy makers for many years? This article explores the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its nuclear saber rattling on Germany’s nuclear policy. We argue that Russia’s war of aggression unsettled the German domestic debate on nuclear deterrence, leading to a new “permissive dissensus.” Supporters of nuclear deterrence seized this moment to push through their preferred policy as Russia’s repeated nuclear threats bolstered the case for nuclear deterrence and momentarily weakened disarmament advocates.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 221-240 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | The Nonproliferation Review |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 4-6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 24 Dec 2024 |
Research programs
- ESSB PA