Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse

Y (Yinyi) Ma, WM de Jong, Joop Koppenjan, B Xi

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperAcademic

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Abstract

Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.
Original languageEnglish
Pages1-6
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Nov 2010
EventNext Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010 - Shenzhen, China
Duration: 11 Nov 201013 Nov 2010

Conference

ConferenceNext Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010
CityShenzhen, China
Period11/11/1013/11/10

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