Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse

Y (Yinyi) Ma; WM de Jong; Joop Koppenjan; B Xi

doi:10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231

Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse

Y (Yinyi) Ma, WM de Jong, Joop Koppenjan, B Xi

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Academic

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Abstract

Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.

Original language	English
Pages	1-6
Number of pages	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231
Publication status	Published - 11 Nov 2010
Event	Next Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010 - Shenzhen, China Duration: 11 Nov 2010 → 13 Nov 2010

Conference

Conference	Next Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010
City	Shenzhen, China
Period	11/11/10 → 13/11/10

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title = "Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse",

abstract = "Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.",

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Ma, Y, de Jong, WM, Koppenjan, J & Xi, B 2010, 'Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse', Paper presented at Next Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010, Shenzhen, China, 11/11/10 - 13/11/10 pp. 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231

Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse. / Ma, Y (Yinyi); de Jong, WM; Koppenjan, Joop et al.
2010. 1-6 Paper presented at Next Generation Infrastructures Conference, Systems of Eco Cities, Shenzhen, China. 11-13 November 2010, Shenzhen, China.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Academic

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AB - Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.

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Perverse Incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: the case of the Hangzhou subway collapse

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