Abstract
Do informal initiatives share a capitalist spirit of entrepreneurship? This article attempts to answer this question, using a "popular economy" analytical framework and focusing on the case of Chile. First, we present the context of the research, namely the economic and political evolutions in Chile since the 1970s and their effects on the popular economy. Then, we seek to answer the original question, relying on in-depth case studies of so-called "popular economy organizations". Our research shows that their socio-economic logics significantly differ from those of the traditional capitalist firm. Our observations also suggest important differences between current and older initiatives.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-78 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | World Development |
| Volume | 64 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Olavarría (2003) and Bresnahan (2003) emphasize the links existing between the political marginalization of popular sectors and the institutional pressures weighing on the political parties at the end of the dictatorship to pursue the economic policies influenced by Pinochet’s neoliberal ideology. Indeed, the junta’s influence extended well beyond the return to democracy through constraints on the decision-making and the representation capacities of political institutions sealed in the 1980 Constitution. This, for instance, proclaimed the military the “guardians of democracy” and sanctioned a series of “authoritarian enclaves” among which 9 designated senators—2 chosen by the president, 3 by the Supreme Court and 4 by the National Security Council, dominated by the military. They were thus ensuring a majority for the right wing at the Senate. The authoritarian enclaves also consisted of a binomial electoral law that produced an overrepresentation of the right, and an amnesty law for the crimes committed by the military. The Constitution as well gave Pinochet a permanent siege at the Senate, which he occupied from 1998 to 2002 and which brought the number of non-democratically elected senators to 10 out of 48. This system of non-elected senators was removed during the reform of the Constitution in August, 2005. According to Olavarría (2003) , the political elites’ response to these constraints guaranteeing the continuity of neoliberal policies consisted in adopting a technocratic approach to the political activity, which weakened their relationships with popular sectors and contributed to their demobilization. Bresnahan (2003) also mentions that the pursuit of neoliberal measures was supported by the main external actors—international financial institutions, the United States, transnational capital—whose hostility could have threatened the democratic transition. Maintaining neoliberal measures was also part of the compromise made by the government to the national right-wing parties.
Funding Information:
As regards relationships with external actors, all groups did—or still do—receive some form of support (funding, commercialization opportunities, training, premises, etc.) by different organisms according to the generation they belong to: 1st- and 2nd-generation groups are or have been supported mainly by secular NGOs, such as the NGO SOL (Solidaridad y Organización Local, Solidarity, and Local Organization), or by organizations depending upon the Catholic Church, such as the “Vicaría de Pastoral Social y de los Trabajadores” or the “Fundación Solidaridad”, and unsurprisingly so as the Church provided a protective umbrella to organizational activity during the dictatorship. As to 3rd-generation groups, they are mainly supported by governmental organisms and programs, whose mission it is to offer funding and training to small initiatives from vulnerable sectors, and by municipalities. This difference among group generations reflects a deeper change in support institutions, namely decreasing support from the traditional supporting actors under the dictatorship, such as the Church 9 9 and secular or religious NGOs, and emerging governmental actors, which either did not exist or did not play this role under the dictatorship and are the result of the more progressive positions of the various governments under the democratic regime.