Abstract
In the market for corporate control, the ownership and control of firms is traded. Mergers and acquisitions are major events for firms affecting the continuity and performance of firms and industries. This paper studies the determinants of takeovers in the Netherlands over a long period, 1961–2008. We conclude that until the mid-1980s targets had low leverage and high cash holdings. After this period, shareholder wealth maximization became a dominant goal, and we find that smaller and more profitable firms become targets for takeovers. In the most recent period takeover defences shield firms from takeover, while this effect is not found in the early period until the mid-1980s. We demonstrate shareholder rights have become important in determining takeover probabilities. The results illustrate the efficacy of rules and regulations and how they can effect the market for corporate control in the Netherlands.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 343-368 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Economist (Netherlands) |
| Volume | 168 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 28 Apr 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The data for this project were collected as part of the NWO project ?The corporate governance of Dutch business in the 20th century?structural change and performance? (NWO 360-52-080). We thank Chris Colvin, Marno Verbeek and an anonymous reviewer for providing comments and Mike Gruenwald, Teus Jan van Ekeren and Renate van der Meer for research assistance.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.