Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions

Amanda Driscoll, Aylin Aydin-Cakir, Susanne Schorpp

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens‐ non‐compliance preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non‐compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)71-90
Number of pages20
JournalComparative Politics
Volume57
Issue number1
Early online date8 May 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2024

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