Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment

C Noussair, DP Soest, van, Jan Stoop

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report the results of a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase the average level of cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)537-559
Number of pages23
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume45
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Sept 2014

Cite this