Render Unto Caesar: EU financial market regulation meets political accountability

N Dorn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper posits three phases in EU financial market regulation. First, for the 1990s, established scholarship suggests leadership by public actors in the context of development of the single market and relations with the US. We adopt this analysis, characterising it as `public-private¿ regulation. Second, in the new millennium regulation shifted towards `private-public¿, with regulators paying more attention to the demands of large financial firms. This tendency is explored through a critical study of `technical¿ decision-making by European Union regulators, focusing upon the Committee of Securities Regulators (CESR) and rating credit agencies. Third, as from 2010 EU policy makers react to the spillover of the financial crisis from markets to member states, some limits to private-public governance have been underlined. The paper concludes with a discussion of positions taken by the European Parliament, moderating claims made for `technical¿ rule-making and opening up the possibility of wider intellectual and policy debate.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-221
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of European Integration / Revue d'integration Europeenne
Volume34
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 May 2011

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