Shareholder activism in Europe: Evidence from shareholder dissent in France, Germany, and the U.K.

Steve Sauerwald, Marc Van Essen, Hans Van Oosterhout

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperAcademic

Abstract

Grounded in an organizational approach to comparative corporate governance, we develop and test a theory on how cost/benefit considerations affect shareholders dissent (i.e., shareholder votes cast against management at shareholder meetings) in a large sample of shareholder and management proposals in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Original languageEnglish
Pages552-557
Number of pages6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Event73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013 - Orlando, United States
Duration: 10 Aug 201312 Aug 2013

Conference

Conference73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityOrlando
Period10/08/1312/08/13

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