Abstract
Grounded in an organizational approach to comparative corporate governance, we develop and test a theory on how cost/benefit considerations affect shareholders dissent (i.e., shareholder votes cast against management at shareholder meetings) in a large sample of shareholder and management proposals in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Original language | English |
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Pages | 552-557 |
Number of pages | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Event | 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013 - Orlando, United States Duration: 10 Aug 2013 → 12 Aug 2013 |
Conference
Conference | 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Orlando |
Period | 10/08/13 → 12/08/13 |