Abstract
Grounded in an organizational approach to comparative corporate governance, we develop and test a theory on how cost/benefit considerations affect shareholders dissent (i.e., shareholder votes cast against management at shareholder meetings) in a large sample of shareholder and management proposals in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 552-557 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
| Event | 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013 - Orlando, United States Duration: 10 Aug 2013 → 12 Aug 2013 |
Conference
| Conference | 73rd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2013 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Orlando |
| Period | 10/08/13 → 12/08/13 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
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