Status and reputation nudging

Julia Rose; Michael Kirchler; Stefan Palan

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031

Status and reputation nudging

Julia Rose^*, Michael Kirchler, Stefan Palan

^*Corresponding author for this work

Applied Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

4 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We conduct a natural field experiment with 808 insurance brokers to test the effects of compliments including status or reputation nudges on reciprocal behavior. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking them to share their expertise on specialist issues. Compared to a neutral request, we find that reputation nudges significantly increase brokers’ response rates and ultimately their willingness to follow through with an initial positive response. We find suggestive evidence for status nudges having a similar impact. These findings hold for several specifications, such as different geographical areas, and for brokers employed with large companies.

Original language	English
Article number	102031
Journal	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume	105
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031
Publication status	Published - Aug 2023

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie Gäbler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas Stöckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper.

Funding Information:
We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie Gäbler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas Stöckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63 ) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713 ) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Author(s)

Access to Document

10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031Licence: CC BY

1-s2.0-S2214804323000575-mainFinal published version, 773 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{7528e5aee93b4ff7890b45a1504615de,

title = "Status and reputation nudging",

abstract = "We conduct a natural field experiment with 808 insurance brokers to test the effects of compliments including status or reputation nudges on reciprocal behavior. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking them to share their expertise on specialist issues. Compared to a neutral request, we find that reputation nudges significantly increase brokers{\textquoteright} response rates and ultimately their willingness to follow through with an initial positive response. We find suggestive evidence for status nudges having a similar impact. These findings hold for several specifications, such as different geographical areas, and for brokers employed with large companies.",

author = "Julia Rose and Michael Kirchler and Stefan Palan",

note = "Funding Information: We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie G{\"a}bler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas St{\"o}ckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper. Funding Information: We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie G{\"a}bler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas St{\"o}ckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63 ) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713 ) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 The Author(s)",

year = "2023",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031",

language = "English",

volume = "105",

journal = "Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics",

issn = "2214-8043",

publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Status and reputation nudging

AU - Rose, Julia

AU - Kirchler, Michael

AU - Palan, Stefan

N1 - Funding Information: We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie Gäbler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas Stöckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper. Funding Information: We thank Loukas Balafoutas, Stefanie Gäbler, Andrea Schertler, Joep Sonnemans, Thomas Stöckl, and Utz Weitzel for very valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. We particularly thank Florian Schwaiger for excellent research assistance. Financial supported by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (START-grant Y617- G11 and SFB F63 ) and the Swedish Research Council (grant 2015-01713 ) is gratefully acknowledged. This study was ethics approved by the IRB of the University of Innsbruck. The authors declare that no financial interests or personal relationships influenced the work reported in this paper. Publisher Copyright: © 2023 The Author(s)

PY - 2023/8

Y1 - 2023/8

N2 - We conduct a natural field experiment with 808 insurance brokers to test the effects of compliments including status or reputation nudges on reciprocal behavior. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking them to share their expertise on specialist issues. Compared to a neutral request, we find that reputation nudges significantly increase brokers’ response rates and ultimately their willingness to follow through with an initial positive response. We find suggestive evidence for status nudges having a similar impact. These findings hold for several specifications, such as different geographical areas, and for brokers employed with large companies.

AB - We conduct a natural field experiment with 808 insurance brokers to test the effects of compliments including status or reputation nudges on reciprocal behavior. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking them to share their expertise on specialist issues. Compared to a neutral request, we find that reputation nudges significantly increase brokers’ response rates and ultimately their willingness to follow through with an initial positive response. We find suggestive evidence for status nudges having a similar impact. These findings hold for several specifications, such as different geographical areas, and for brokers employed with large companies.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85159930394&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031

DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102031

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85159930394

SN - 2214-8043

VL - 105

JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

M1 - 102031

ER -

Status and reputation nudging

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this