“That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency

Frederik Van De Putte

doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9829-3

“That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency

Frederik Van De Putte^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

9 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency (often interpreted as obligation, resp. strong permission), as originally proposed in van Benthem (Bull Sect Log 8(1):36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. (Rev Symb Log 8(4):807–827, 2015).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	473-511
Number of pages	39
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	82
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9829-3
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2017
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Research for this paper was funded by subventions of the Flemish Research Foundation (FWO-Vlaanderen). We are indebted to Huimin Dong, Olivier Roy, Gillman Payette, and two anonymous referees for comments on and discussions of previous versions.

Publisher Copyright: © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

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Putte2017_Article_ThatWillDoLogicsOfDeonticNecesFinal published version, 684 KBLicence: Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act

Cite this

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“That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency

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