The accidental Trojan horse: Plea bargaining as an anticorruption tool in Brazil

Fausto de Assis Ribeiro

Research output: Working paperAcademic


This paper employs the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as a model to
understand the legislative process that led to the implementation of plea
bargaining as an anticorruption tool in Brazil. Through the analysis of primary
qualitative data, it assesses the political and social forces that formed a coalition
and propelled this legislative process forward, thus allowing the posterior
emergence of the largest anticorruption judicial action in the history of Brazil.
In doing so, it elucidates the reasons that led a systemically corrupt legislative
to enact a remarkably effective anticorruption policy, often to the detriment of
lawmakers themselves. This paper’s contribution to the literature about the
anticorruption framework in Brazil lies in its critical interpretation of the
interplay of political forces involved in the early stages of policy formulation. It
adds empirical elements to a modern institutional approach to the study of
corruption, which derives from classical theories about the formation of
Brazilian society. Finally, the paper serves as an illustration of the difficulties
inherent to applying the ACF in dysfunctional contexts, such as those marked
by systemic corruption.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationDen Haag
PublisherInternational Institute of Social Studies (ISS)
Number of pages57
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2017
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

SeriesISS working papers. General series


  • ISS Working Paper-General Series


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