The devil we know and the devils we don’t: A historical analysis of DuPont’s PFOA-scandal in the Netherlands as a (state-) corporate crime

In 1946, the American chemical company DuPont introduced Teflon, using perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). Internal research showed that this ‘forever chemical’ was toxic, but production continued until the phasing-out was started in 2002, one year after the American PFOA-scandal. However, the Dutch subsidiary in Dordrecht (Chemours/DuPont) continued production until 2012. To understand how this could continue this long this study examines the Chemours/DuPont case using (state-)corporate crime literature. A historical analysis was carried out based on newspaper articles, internal documents, government and NGO reports, historical images, a former employee’s memoir and seven interviews with (former) government officials. The results indicate that meso- and macro-level factors contributed to continued PFOA-production: DuPont’s positive reputation, close ties between the multinational and local government and fragmented regulatory supervision.The most prominent factor is the legislation , which places the responsibility to disclose the toxicity with companies, thereby strengthening their information monopoly and weakening the position of supervisory authorities. PFOA is now prohibited and a restriction for all forever chemicals is in the works, but the true challenge is not the devil we know, but the devils we don’t. This study discusses the implications of these findings for (state-)corporate crime literature.