The elimination of broker voting in director elections

A Akyol; K Raff; Patrick Verwijmeren

doi:10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001

The elimination of broker voting in director elections

A Akyol, K Raff, Patrick Verwijmeren

Business Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	34-39
Number of pages	6
Journal	Finance Research Letters
Volume	21
Issue number	May
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001
Publication status	Published - 2017

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10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001

http://hdl.handle.net/1765/97845

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title = "The elimination of broker voting in director elections",

abstract = "In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.",

author = "A Akyol and K Raff and Patrick Verwijmeren",

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AU - Akyol, A

AU - Raff, K

AU - Verwijmeren, Patrick

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AB - In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.

U2 - 10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001

DO - 10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001

M3 - Article

SN - 1544-6123

VL - 21

SP - 34

EP - 39

JO - Finance Research Letters

JF - Finance Research Letters

IS - May

ER -

The elimination of broker voting in director elections

Abstract

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