The influence of CEO compensation on employee engagement

Martijn Hendriks*, Martijn Burger, Harry Commandeur

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)
3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The soaring compensation levels of chief executive officers (CEOs) have spurred an intense debate about its outcomes. This paper examines an understudied outcome in this regard: employee engagement. Using a dynamic panel model with data from 336 publicly listed firms across 26 countries, we find that employee engagement is generally unaffected by CEO (over)compensation. However, negative effects emerge under specific conditions. First, employee engagement declines with negative media coverage about CEO compensation. Second, employee engagement declines with greater CEO (over)compensation in the financial sector, which is a sector with extraordinary levels of CEO compensation and compensation controversies. The findings suggest that a ceiling effect exists, at which point negative effects emerge and employee engagement becomes relevant in determining CEO compensation policies, while the general insensitivity of employee engagement to CEO compensation can help explain the soaring CEO compensation levels.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages27
JournalReview of Managerial Science
Early online date17 Mar 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Mar 2022

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