The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

Molood Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi; Amineh Ghorbani; Paulien Herder; Mike Farjam; Anders Forsman; René van Weeren; Tine De Moor; Giangiacomo Bravo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

Molood Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi^*, Amineh Ghorbani, Paulien Herder, Mike Farjam, Anders Forsman, René van Weeren, Tine De Moor, Giangiacomo Bravo

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Business-Society Management

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic

Abstract

Common-pool resources (CPR) are shared resources that can be at the risk of depletion as a result of over-use [1]. To avoid the Tragedy of the commons, users can build institutions for collective action, i.e., systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms that allow for collective management and use of those resources [2]. In other words, such institutions are the collection of rules-in-use that emerge as a result of collective decision making of entitled users [3]. The cooperation among the members of an institution for collective action can enable the sustainable governance of resources. However, these members are heterogeneous in different way, possibly affecting their level of cooperation. In commons literature, heterogeneity is defined as diversity in wealth, power, cast, preferences, income among commoners [4, 5].

While theoretical research suggests that inequality can have a positive influence on collective action [6], some empirical studies have highlighted the...

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019
Editors	Petra Ahrweiler, Martin Neumann
Publisher	Springer Science+Business Media
Pages	375-379
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Print)	9783030615024
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2021
Event	15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019 - Mainz, Germany Duration: 23 Sept 2019 → 27 Sept 2019

Publication series

Series	Springer Proceedings in Complexity
ISSN	2213-8684

Conference

Conference	15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Mainz
Period	23/09/19 → 27/09/19

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

Cite this

Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi, M., Ghorbani, A., Herder, P., Farjam, M., Forsman, A., van Weeren, R., De Moor, T., & Bravo, G. (2021). The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource. In P. Ahrweiler, & M. Neumann (Eds.), Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019 (pp. 375-379). Springer Science+Business Media. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi, Molood ; Ghorbani, Amineh ; Herder, Paulien et al. / The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource. Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019. editor / Petra Ahrweiler ; Martin Neumann. Springer Science+Business Media, 2021. pp. 375-379 (Springer Proceedings in Complexity).

@inbook{dea7f6baebab4f5d9ed1edbe26f98e98,

title = "The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource",

abstract = "Common-pool resources (CPR) are shared resources that can be at the risk of depletion as a result of over-use [1]. To avoid the Tragedy of the commons, users can build institutions for collective action, i.e., systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms that allow for collective management and use of those resources [2]. In other words, such institutions are the collection of rules-in-use that emerge as a result of collective decision making of entitled users [3]. The cooperation among the members of an institution for collective action can enable the sustainable governance of resources. However, these members are heterogeneous in different way, possibly affecting their level of cooperation. In commons literature, heterogeneity is defined as diversity in wealth, power, cast, preferences, income among commoners [4, 5].While theoretical research suggests that inequality can have a positive influence on collective action [6], some empirical studies have highlighted the...",

author = "{Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi}, Molood and Amineh Ghorbani and Paulien Herder and Mike Farjam and Anders Forsman and {van Weeren}, Ren{\'e} and {De Moor}, Tine and Giangiacomo Bravo",

year = "2021",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36",

language = "English",

isbn = "9783030615024",

series = "Springer Proceedings in Complexity",

pages = "375--379",

editor = "Petra Ahrweiler and Martin Neumann",

booktitle = "Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019",

publisher = "Springer Science+Business Media",

address = "Germany",

note = "15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019 ; Conference date: 23-09-2019 Through 27-09-2019",

}

Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi, M, Ghorbani, A, Herder, P, Farjam, M, Forsman, A, van Weeren, R, De Moor, T & Bravo, G 2021, The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource. in P Ahrweiler & M Neumann (eds), Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019. Springer Science+Business Media, Springer Proceedings in Complexity, pp. 375-379, 15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019, Mainz, Germany, 23/09/19. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource. / Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi, Molood; Ghorbani, Amineh; Herder, Paulien et al.
Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019. ed. / Petra Ahrweiler; Martin Neumann. Springer Science+Business Media, 2021. p. 375-379 (Springer Proceedings in Complexity).

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic

TY - CHAP

T1 - The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

AU - Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi, Molood

AU - Ghorbani, Amineh

AU - Herder, Paulien

AU - Farjam, Mike

AU - Forsman, Anders

AU - van Weeren, René

AU - De Moor, Tine

AU - Bravo, Giangiacomo

PY - 2021/1/1

Y1 - 2021/1/1

N2 - Common-pool resources (CPR) are shared resources that can be at the risk of depletion as a result of over-use [1]. To avoid the Tragedy of the commons, users can build institutions for collective action, i.e., systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms that allow for collective management and use of those resources [2]. In other words, such institutions are the collection of rules-in-use that emerge as a result of collective decision making of entitled users [3]. The cooperation among the members of an institution for collective action can enable the sustainable governance of resources. However, these members are heterogeneous in different way, possibly affecting their level of cooperation. In commons literature, heterogeneity is defined as diversity in wealth, power, cast, preferences, income among commoners [4, 5].While theoretical research suggests that inequality can have a positive influence on collective action [6], some empirical studies have highlighted the...

AB - Common-pool resources (CPR) are shared resources that can be at the risk of depletion as a result of over-use [1]. To avoid the Tragedy of the commons, users can build institutions for collective action, i.e., systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms that allow for collective management and use of those resources [2]. In other words, such institutions are the collection of rules-in-use that emerge as a result of collective decision making of entitled users [3]. The cooperation among the members of an institution for collective action can enable the sustainable governance of resources. However, these members are heterogeneous in different way, possibly affecting their level of cooperation. In commons literature, heterogeneity is defined as diversity in wealth, power, cast, preferences, income among commoners [4, 5].While theoretical research suggests that inequality can have a positive influence on collective action [6], some empirical studies have highlighted the...

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85106409227&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85106409227

SN - 9783030615024

T3 - Springer Proceedings in Complexity

SP - 375

EP - 379

BT - Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019

A2 - Ahrweiler, Petra

A2 - Neumann, Martin

PB - Springer Science+Business Media

T2 - 15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019

Y2 - 23 September 2019 through 27 September 2019

ER -

Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi M, Ghorbani A, Herder P, Farjam M, Forsman A, van Weeren R et al. The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource. In Ahrweiler P, Neumann M, editors, Advances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019. Springer Science+Business Media. 2021. p. 375-379. (Springer Proceedings in Complexity). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-61503-1_36

The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this