The Role of Wealth Inequality on Collective Action for Management of Common Pool Resource

Molood Ale Ebrahim Dehkordi*, Amineh Ghorbani, Paulien Herder, Mike Farjam, Anders Forsman, René van Weeren, Tine De Moor, Giangiacomo Bravo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic


Common-pool resources (CPR) are shared resources that can be at the risk of depletion as a result of over-use [1]. To avoid the Tragedy of the commons, users can build institutions for collective action, i.e., systems of rules and enforcement mechanisms that allow for collective management and use of those resources [2]. In other words, such institutions are the collection of rules-in-use that emerge as a result of collective decision making of entitled users [3]. The cooperation among the members of an institution for collective action can enable the sustainable governance of resources. However, these members are heterogeneous in different way, possibly affecting their level of cooperation. In commons literature, heterogeneity is defined as diversity in wealth, power, cast, preferences, income among commoners [4, 5].

While theoretical research suggests that inequality can have a positive influence on collective action [6], some empirical studies have highlighted the...
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Social Simulation - Proceedings of the 15th Social Simulation Conference, 2019
EditorsPetra Ahrweiler, Martin Neumann
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9783030615024
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021
Event15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019 - Mainz, Germany
Duration: 23 Sep 201927 Sep 2019

Publication series

SeriesSpringer Proceedings in Complexity


Conference15th Social Simulation Conference, SSC 2019


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